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RESUMÉ 
Denne artikel undersøger grænselandet mellem dokumentar- og 
fiktionsdiskurs gennem en analyse af Casey Afflecks hybridfilm, I’m Still Here 
(2010). Filmens brug af ironi – tekstuelt såvel som ekstratekstuelt – fordrer et 
blik på, hvordan forskellige vidensniveauer mellem filmens sociale aktører, 
karakterer og tilskuere er organiseret. Den opstillede analytiske tilgang kan 
endvidere bruges til at skelne mellem typer af hybridfilm i en bredere forstand. 
Afslutningsvist argumenterer denne artikel for, at den ironiske dobbeltdiskurs, 
der beskrives som en specifik variant af hybridfilmen, er i stand til at producere 
dokumentar- og fiktionsdiskurs samtidigt.  
 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the border zone between documentary and fiction 
discourse through an investigation of Casey Affleck’s hybrid film, I’m Still Here 
(2010). With the film’s attribution of textual and extra-textual irony, the article 
focuses on the organization of levels of knowledge among social actors, 
characters, and spectators. The established analytical framework can also help 
distinguish between different variations of hybrid cinema. In conclusion, this 
article argues that the ironic double discourse, described as a specific variant of 
hybrid cinema, is capable of producing documentary and fiction discourse 
simultaneously.    
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These new films create fictional characters who are let loose in the 
so-called reality – so that the documentation of the outside world's 
reactions to the fictions becomes somewhat authentic. (Lars Movin 
2011)1 
Discussions about the distinction between documentary and fiction 
representation are as old as the medium of film itself, yet still we find the world 
of cinema – on the big screen, on Netflix, at film festivals, etc. – clearly divided 
into documentary and fiction sections. Our perception of the world – and in 
turn, our perception of cinema – is highly dependent on our ability to 
distinguish between what is to be taken ‘for real’ – and what is made up. Some 
argue that without this ability, we would simply not be able to operate 
cognitively (Nielsen et al. 2013). Others argue that the very ability to 
distinguish is a general and universal constant, present in all cultures at all 
times (Schaeffer 2012).  
As mentioned in the introductory quote, however, many new films deliberately 
seek to shatter the irreconcilability between documentary and fiction, the ‘real’ 
and the made up, as they introduce a cunning kind of irony between spectators 
watching the film – and social actors, and characters in the film itself.2 In these 
films – such as Mads Brügger’s The Ambassador (2011); Sacha Baron Cohen’s 
Borat (Larry Charles 2006); and the object of interest in this article, Casey 
Affleck’s and Joaquin Phoenix’s I’m Still Here (2010) – people are not exactly 
what they seem.   
The curious case of I’m Still Here begins in October 2008. After a Paul Newman 
tribute and fundraiser show in San Francisco, an awkward, bearded, and 
overweight variant of Joaquin Phoenix, who the public had come to know as a 
charismatic and respected actor in films such as Gladiator (Ridley Scott 2000) 
and Walk the Line (James Mangold 2005), surprisingly declared his retirement 
from acting. Standing next to him, Casey Affleck – his friend, actor colleague, 
and brother-in-law – announced that he was documenting Phoenix’ pursuit of 
                                                 
1 All Danish quotes are translated into English by the writer. 
2 In this article, I will employ a distinction between character (what is played) and the person 
or actor (who is playing). This was originally suggested by Aristotle in Poetics (2001). Also, I 
will adopt the term ‘social actor’ (see Nichols 2010 [2001]) when referring to referential, ‘real’ 
people in a given film. 
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a music career, which he would make into a documentary (I’m Still Here, ca. 
10.45-11.05). Two years and several disastrous rap concerts later, the film I’m 
Still Here premiered at Venice Film Festival on September 6, 2010. Here, it was 
introduced as “a striking portrayal of a tumultuous year in the life of 
internationally acclaimed actor Joaquin Phoenix” and “a portrait of an artist at 
a crossroad” (Complete Press Kit 2010). In not-so-vague terms: as a 
documentary.  
Ten days after the Venice premiere – on September 16, 2010 – everything was 
turned upside-down. Affleck told The New York Times and late film critic Roger 
Ebert that I’m Still Here was anything but a striking portrayal or a documentary; 
it was staged and a complete hoax (Cieply 2010; Ebert 2010b). Affleck also 
revealed that only a small circle of the people participating in the film knew 
about ‘the project’, meaning that the majority of people with whom Phoenix 
engaged in the film – David Letterman, journalists, audiences at concerts, 
bookers, etc. – were not informed about the basic nature or purpose of what 
was being and had been made. Quite naturally, people were – and still are – 
confused. Some film critics (e.g. Høeg 2010; Skotte 2010) suggested that the 
revelation completely excluded any particular authenticity of the film’s initial 
documentary status.3 It was also argued that Affleck’s statement repositioned 
the film in a fiction mode resembling the prototypical mockumentary: a fiction 
film pretending to be a documentary, in which all of the initially accepted 
documentary markers can be dismissed as deceitful, fictional inventions. But 
does this interpretation make sense in the case of I’m Still Here? Was it all a 
hoax, and can everything in the film be dismissed as ‘pure fiction’? 
This is what this article wishes to investigate, and even though we must direct 
attention to the extra-textual happenings surrounding the film, I will argue that 
the key to understanding I’m Still Here is found in the film itself. More precisely, 
the key is how irony relates to the organization of situational or existential 
knowledge. In I’m Still Here, somebody knows or understands something that 
others do not – but who knows what and when about which discursive status 
the film was in fact part of? In turn, we might ask: how does Phoenix’s ironic 
behavior affect our (the interpreters or addressees of the situational irony) 
                                                 
3 Danish film critics are referenced because I’m Still Here’s Danish premiere (November 11, 
2010) occurred after the revelation. 
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ability to decide whether the film is ‘real’ or ‘fake’? These questions must be 
answered before we can discuss how I’m Still Here can simultaneously present 
both documentary and fiction discourse – and in turn pose a piercing critique 
of notions of liberation related to modern cinema and media identity. 
The ironic double discourse: hybrid cinema between documentary and 
fiction 
It is the hypothesis of this article that I’m Still Here is best viewed as belonging 
to a group of new films that are identified by their use of what can be labeled 
the ironic double discourse. The ironic double discourse is a discursive strategy 
in which both fiction and documentary is created textually through use of 
irony, style, and differing levels of knowledge. The ironic double discursive 
film presents referential ‘real’ people – in I’m Still Here, for instance, Joaquin 
Phoenix and David Letterman. At first, the spectator is likely to interpret the 
film as a documentary – or alternatively as a mockumentary. 4  This inter-
pretation is related to the use of stylistic characteristics normally attributed to 
the documentary but also to extra-textual indexing: how a given film is 
described by the producer (Carroll 1996, 238). I’m Still Here was, for instance, 
indexed as a documentary when it premiered at the Venice Film Festival. At 
some point, the initial interpretation is undermined. This can happen both over 
the course of viewing the actual film (textually) or in the context (extra-
textually), and the film thereby partly or completely becomes something else: 
here, the ironic double discourse. This reversal is inextricably linked to the use 
of irony, which I will explain in the following sections. 
Generically speaking, the ironic double discourse is part of ‘hybrid cinema’, 
which is here understood as a mode of film that challenges our perceptions of 
the border zone between documentary and fiction discourse. With small 
variations, hybrid cinema is also what other scholars are investigating under 
labels such as  ‘borderline cases’ (Cohn 1999), ‘multiaccentual cinema’ (Fetveit 
2003), ‘faction’ (Harms Larsen 1990), or ‘fiction-equivocal works’ (Nielsen et al. 
2013). 
                                                 
4 I will return to a discussion on the difference between the ironic double discourse and the 
mockumentary but will for now just state that there are essential differences in how they 
organize knowledge. 
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Irony and levels of knowledge in hybrid cinema 
In the unanimous and voluminous writing about irony, one point seems to be 
agreed upon: that irony has historically been viewed as a complex concept that 
can be investigated from a variety of theoretical and ideological perspectives. 
However, as this is neither an in-depth historical nor ideological analysis of 
irony, I will limit myself to a descriptive explanation of how irony can be 
framed in relation to cinema – more specifically, to levels of knowledge in 
cinema.  
Firstly though, we must discuss the basic premises through which irony 
‘happens’. In Irony's Edge (1995, 10), Linda Hutcheon performs an exemplary 
investigation into how irony can be understood “as a discursive strategy 
operating at the level of language (verbal) or form (musical, visual, textual).” 
Furthermore, she identifies the key players in the communicative situation – 
the ironist and interpreter – between whom irony arises. From the point of view 
of the ironist, irony is defined as the “intentional transmission of both 
information and evaluative attitude other than what is explicitly presented” 
(Hutcheon 1995, 11). From the point of view of the interpreter, irony is 
described as “an interpretive and intentional move: it is the making or inferring 
of meaning in addition to and different from what is stated, together with an 
attitude toward both the said and the unsaid” (Hutcheon 1995, 11).  
As Thomas Bredsdorff mentions in Ironiens Pris (2011, 20, 46), irony can also be 
understood as a situational or existential characteristic (when an ironist is not 
only using verbal irony but is also being ironic about the basic premise of the 
situation: the ironist is not saying something ironic but is instead acting 
ironically) and as a characteristic that describes an attitude toward life.5 In this 
section, I will discuss the first two types (rhetorical irony and situational irony), 
whereas irony as an attitude toward life – which relates to, for instance, Søren 
Kierkegaard’s version of irony as investigated in Om Begrebet Ironi (1962 [1841]) 
– will be discussed in the final section.  
 
                                                 
5 Bredsdorff (2011) also discusses Socratic irony, dramatic irony, romantic irony, the irony of 
fate, and self-irony, all of which exceed the focus of this article. 
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Rhetorical irony and levels of knowledge 
Let us begin with Bredsdorff’s (2011, 25-26) paraphrased version of the Roman 
rhetorician Quintilian’s definition of rhetorical irony: “Irony is to say the 
opposite of what you mean in a way that it appears from the tone, the speaker, 
the text, or the context that the meaning is different from the wording.” From 
this, it becomes clear that this form of irony resembles other rhetorical and 
literary tropes such as metonymy, synecdoche, metaphors, and perhaps most 
obviously – lying. However, the intention (from the point of view of the ironist) 
is quite different from that of lying, as is clear from the second part of the 
sentence: “in a way so that it appears (…) that the meaning is different from the 
wording” (Bredsdorff 2011, 25-26). Here, as Bredsdorff (2011, 22-24) also notes, 
we can distinguish between what Kierkegaard (1962 [1841], 263) calls “the 
phenomenon” (the utterance) and “the essence” (the meaning). This is also 
what Hutcheon – perhaps in more contemporary language – calls the expression 
and the understanding. But what alerts the interpreter to the essence of the 
uttered expression? According to Hutcheon (1995, 11), the interpreter is alerted 
by the presence of “conflictual textual or contextual evidence or by markers 
which are socially agreed upon.” The prepositional part of Bredsdorff’s (2011, 
26) Quintilian definition agrees with this and answers the question more 
precisely: through “the tone, the speaker, the text, or the context.” 
Inevitably, ironic communication can result in two opposing situations: one in 
which the irony is understood and one in which it is not. This understanding 
ultimately relates to the concept of knowledge – and to the question of Who 
knows what and when? When we refer to knowledge in cinema, we usually do 
so in relation to range or levels of story information among the narrator, 
characters, and spectator (see for instance Bordwell; Thompson 2008, 88-92). At 
its most basic, a cinematic situation presents these different actors: a 
protagonist (P), who communicates an utterance to a secondary agent (A). This 
also includes a spectator position (S). P can know more, less, or the same as A 
and S – and the same goes for A and S.6 
Take the example of one of the first films ever made, L’Arroseur Arrosé (Lumière 
1895). A man (P) is watering his garden with a hose when a boy (A) enters the 
                                                 
6 In practice, this is more complicated as there are more character and spectator positions, 
suggesting P2, A2, S2, etc. Here, I will work with the simplified PAS model. 
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frame and closes in on the man from behind. A steps on the hose, and the water 
stops. P inspects the hose and A then removes his foot from the hose, shooting 
water into P’s face. At this point, P knows less than A. Because of the framing 
of the shot, the spectator (S) knows more than P and the same as A. When P 
turns around and realizes what has happened, the levels of story information 
go from hierarchical to equal. This transition, and the fact that S has 




Fig. 1. First (above), there is a hierarchical level of story information in L’Arroseur Arrosé. A 
few seconds later (below), it turns into an equal level of story information. 
 
Now, when rhetorical irony is introduced in any given film, the key concern is: 
if P expresses something ironic, do A and/or S recognize only the expression or 
understand both the expression and the essence? First, if the essence of an ironic 
expression made by P is understood by A and S, they will all share the same 
knowledge. Second, if the essence of an ironic expression made by P is not 
understood by A and S (or by one of them), a hierarchical level of knowledge 
is created. If the lack of understanding is intentional from the point of view of 
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P, this use of irony is what gives P (whether he/she is a social actor or a 
character) the ability to say something to somebody (A or S) without another 
somebody (again A or S) being able to understand the intention. This is what 
gives irony its edge (recall the title of Hutcheon’s book: Irony’s Edge) as a social 
and/or political tool. 
An illustrative example of the use of rhetorical irony is found in Mads 
Brügger’s aforementioned The Ambassador. In order to infiltrate the dubious 
diplomatic system and the relationships between Europe and the African 
nations of Liberia and the Central African Republic (CAR), Mads Brügger 
creates a fictional character, Mads Cortzen, who engages with uninformed 
social actors. In many conversations with these social actors, Brügger/Cortzen 
employs rhetorical irony, which the informed spectator (S) – Brügger tells the 
spectator in Scene 3 that he is going undercover – understands. In Scene 28, for 
instance, he (P) insults Asian people in front of his African interpreter and 
assistant, Paul (A): “It is not to be racistic [sic] but, you know, I have a problem 
with Asian people. They are always very sneaky; they are very greedy… and 
difficult to trust. And they have bad manners” (The Ambassador, ca. 26.40). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Brügger/Cortzen as rhetorical ironist in The Ambassador.  
 
We cannot be sure what Paul’s honest opinions about Asian people are, as he 
is most likely trying to please his employer – yet Paul agrees with him. The joke 
is ‘on’ Paul. He does not understand Brügger’s irony, and Paul – not Brügger – 
is in turn portrayed as a man who has very questionable opinions about race. 
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Fig. 3 below illustrates the different levels of knowledge when rhetorical irony 
is present. To the left (1) we see that P, A, and S have the same level of 
knowledge if the irony is understood. To the right, it is illustrated how P can 
express something (2) that neither A nor S understand, (3) that only A 
understands, and (4) that only S understands. The Ambassador exemplifies (4). 
 
 + Irony   ÷ Irony  
    (1) 
 
        (2)         (3) (4) 
 PAS  P PA PS 
   AS S A 
 
Fig. 3. Equal (1) and hierarchical (2,3,4) levels of knowledge 
 
Situational irony and the mockumentary 
In the present article, situational irony is defined as a variant of irony that 
creates existential uncertainty in the spectator/interpreter’s evaluation of a 
given film’s discursive status. As mentioned above, this occurs when an ironist 
is not only using verbal irony but is also being ironic about the basic premise 
of the situation: the ironist is not saying something ironic but is acting 
ironically. In I’m Still Here, the situational irony is mainly related to the identity 
of Joaquin Phoenix: is he acting, or is he ‘for real’ about his change of career, 
appearance, and behavior? The question of Who knows what and when? becomes 
more complex when situational irony is introduced in a given film. Then the 
question becomes: Who knows what and when about the existential status of the 
cinematic situation? 
Situational irony can work in different ways, which I will exemplify here by 
comparing two mockumentaries – a film mode that also can be said to ‘play’ 
with situational irony: Zelig (Woody Allen 1983) and Forgotten Silver (Costa 
Botes, Peter Jackson 1995). In Zelig, the situational irony is easily 
understandable for the spectator (S) as Zelig (Allen), the protagonist (P), is able 
to physically transform himself in front of other characters (A). As this is not 
possible within the laws of human physics, the conclusion is quite clear from 
the beginning: it is a fiction film ‘pretending’ to be a documentary – and it 
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presents an equal level of knowledge (Fig. 3 – (1)). Besides creating one of the 
first ever mockumentaries, the mockery in Zelig is thus not directed at 
spectators; it is instead a mockery of the documentary form’s claim to represent 
reality. 
The situation in the case of Forgotten Silver is quite different. When it aired on 
New Zealand national television, many spectators were tricked into 
interpreting the film about the enigmatic Colin McKenzie as a documentary. It 
was a very spectacular documentary indeed, as McKenzie – according to the 
film – created all sorts of groundbreaking inventions such as a flying vehicle 
(before the Wright Brothers) and in a cinematic context: the close-up, color film, 
and the moving camera. The fact that referential, ‘real’ social actors like film 
producer Harvey Weinstein and film critic Leonard Maltin introduced and 
verified McKenzie in talking-head interviews might have helped support the 
documentary interpretation. As it turned out, however, McKenzie was (of 
course) a character wholly invented by the directors. In comparison to Zelig, 
the use of situational irony in Forgotten Silver is more difficult to grasp, and thus 
the effect of the film becomes more complex. Besides mocking the documentary 
form’s claim to represent ‘reality’, it also directed its mockery at spectators who 
were unable to understand the essence of the ironic situation. In the case of 
Forgotten Silver, if the situational irony is not understood by the spectator, the 
film will (wrongly) appear to be a documentary; if it is understood, it will 
(correctly) appear to be a mockumentary.  
However – and this is important to keep in mind when we now embark upon 
an analysis of I’m Still Here – there will only ever be an equal level of situational 
or existential knowledge (again Fig. 3 – (1)) in mockumentaries. The same goes 
for documentaries and fiction films for that matter. Even though Forgotten Silver 
made some spectators believe that McKenzie had lived, Weinstein, Maltin, and 
other ‘experts’ were all familiar with the hoax beforehand. Their function was 
not to tell the story of McKenzie; it was to mislead spectators into believing that 
McKenzie was, in fact, real (even though he was not). In I’m Still Here 
specifically and the ironic double discourse more generally, the mockery 
reaches a new level, as – quite frankly – everyone and everything are mocked: 
the social actors in the film and the spectators watching it, the documentary 
form’s claim to represent ‘reality’, and the commonsense notion that 
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documentary and fiction discourse cannot exist simultaneously on a textual 
level. 
The ironic double discourse in I’m Still Here  
Let us return to I’m Still Here and its realm of irony, in which people were – and 
still are – left in a state of confusion concerning its discursive status. As we have 
learned, it is helpful to pay attention to how irony is attributed by the ironist-
protagonist (P) and in turn how it affects the levels of knowledge for social 
actors (A) on-screen and spectators (S) off-screen. This matter is further 
complicated by the fact that the film relates to different interpretations 
separated by time: before and after Affleck’s revelation of the hoax.  
The first interpretation: the reflexive-performative documentary  
Prior to September 16, 2010, it was all rather simple, as the actions and 
statements of Affleck and Phoenix in the public sphere – which constitute main 
parts of the film itself – were aimed at indexing the film as a reflexive-
performative documentary (see Nichols 2010 [2001] and Bruzzi 2000). And 
even though many suspected the project to be a hoax, the documentary 
interpretation was widely opted for prior to the revelation. 7  This was also 
caused by I’m Still Here’s use of stylistic characteristics normally associated 
with documentaries. In the very first scene of the film, for example, we watch 
what appears to be an old found footage/home movie recording of a young boy 
and a man. Because spectators at this point would most likely know that this is 
a film about Phoenix (whether it is a hoax or not), an educated guess is that the 
boy is Phoenix and the other person his father. How can spectators assume that 
the first scene is an actual recording? At this initial stage, I would argue that it 
is mainly due to the style: the grainy quality and the date-and-time 
function/intertitles in the lower left-hand corner is (or was) a defining 
characteristic of video recorders used for home movie recordings (see Fig. 4). 
                                                 
7 The late film critic Roger Ebert, for instance, described the film as “a sad and painful 
documentary” (Ebert 2010a). On September 22, 2010 (after the hoax was revealed), Ebert 
(2010b) summed up the confused popular reception: “Major reviews of "I'm Still Here" 
linked at Metacritic indicate that only six stated flatly the film was not genuine. Nine 
believed it, and the rest were not sure, had doubts, were cagey, or left themselves wriggle 
room.” 
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Furthermore, it appears to be shot on location with a hand-held camera and 
without artificial lighting.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Docu-style in I’m Still Here (ca. 01.05) 
 
The second interpretation: the ironic double discourse 
After September 16, 2010, spectators (or at least most spectators) learned that 
rapper-Joaquin Phoenix was a hoax, a fictional character, and when (or if) the 
essence of his situational irony is recognized and understood, it simply creates 
a doubling of existential knowledge for the spectators. On one hand, spectators 
are able to recognize that actor-Joaquin Phoenix is playing a fictional character, 
rapper-Joaquin Phoenix; on the other hand, they are just as able to see that 
many of the social actors onscreen – David Letterman, journalists, audiences at 
concerts, bookers, etc. – are unable to recognize this very fact. To illustrate 
precisely how this works, I will analyze different perspectives in the key 
sequence in which Phoenix is interviewed on Late Show with David Letterman on 
February 11, 2009 (I’m Still Here, ca. 1.10.40-1.14.45).  
In this sequence, Phoenix engages with social actors within the public sphere, 
illustrating Movin's (2011) observation about “fictional characters who are let 
loose in the so-called reality.” On one hand, Phoenix engages in a fiction mode 
resembling interview sequences found in, for instance, the aforementioned 
Borat. On the other hand, Letterman and the baffled audience of the interview 
engage in a nonfictional discourse – a journalistic interview in which he and 
they expect rapper-Phoenix to be identical to actor-Phoenix or the ‘real’ 
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Phoenix. Phoenix – as the ironist – is playing with the existential nature of his 
identity, and this application of situational irony creates a hierarchical level of 
knowledge wherein Phoenix (P) and Letterman (A) do not share the same 
situational or existential knowledge about the discursive status of the sequence. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Hierarchical levels of situational knowledge in I’m Still Here (ca. 1.12.30) 
 
The spectator position and conflictual textual evidence 
To be able to acknowledge the ironic double discourse, spectators must be able 
to attribute the correct essence to the situational irony applied by the ironist, 
Phoenix. If they are unable to do so, they are likely to interpret the scene as 
either a reflexive-performative documentary scene or as a mockumentary 
scene. But what alerts spectators to the correct interpretation? Again, let us also 
recall Bredsdorff’s (2011, 25-26) definition in which “the tone, the speaker, the 
text” are mentioned as possible means of recognizing and understanding irony. 
This becomes apparent in the Letterman sequence, as there are a variety of 
textual cues that something is off – what Hutcheon (1995, 11) labels “conflictual 
textual evidence.” Letterman himself seems to be in a state of existential 
confusion: take a look, for instance, at his facial expression in Fig. 5. He is quite 
clearly sensing that something is wrong, but as neither Phoenix nor Letterman 
call the bluff, the interview quickly becomes a staggeringly awkward one. The 
fact that Letterman gradually (and probably) becomes aware of Phoenix’s 
situational irony is substantiated by his ambiguously foresighted final words: 
“Joaquin, I am sorry you couldn’t be here tonight” (I’m Still Here, ca. 1.14.35). 
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As a matter of fact, the film is full of conflictual textual evidence. This is, for 
instance, experienced in the scene in which Phoenix is paid a visit by actor 
Edward James Olmos (ca. 43.05-45.25). Here, Olmos speaks in a highly poetic 
tone that clearly resembles written dialogue: “That’s me, and that is you. Drops 
of water. And you are on the top of the mountain of success.” As a possible 
result, spectators are likely to evaluate Olmos’ appearance as unauthentic in 
the context of a documentary. In turn, this might cause the documentary 
interpretation to start collapsing – which again will force spectators to reclassify 
the film as something different from a reflexive-performative documentary. 
Recall also Ebert’s (2010b) quasi-scientific quantification of critics in the US: 
“only six stated flatly the film was not genuine. Nine believed it, and the rest 
were not sure, had doubts, were cagey, or left themselves wriggle room.” There 
were strong (and reasonable) doubts about the film’s discursive status before 
Affleck and Phoenix came clean. 
The spectators who are able to understand the situational irony (whether it is 
due to textual or extra-textual evidence or both) find themselves in a privileged 
position. They (S) are on the same level of knowledge as Phoenix (P), 
recognizing the fictional discursive status attributed by Phoenix, which 
Letterman (A) cannot quite grasp. In turn, they are also able to recognize that 
Letterman adheres to another discourse: that of a journalistic and nonfictional 
interview, even though he possibly senses that something is wrong. 
 
 
Fig. 6. The ironic double discourse in I’m Still Here (ca. 1.12.30) 
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Ultimately, when the hierarchical levels of situational or existential knowledge 
are created in the film itself through situational irony and understood by 
spectators, the ironic double discursive variant of hybrid cinema is present. The 
film simultaneously possesses both discourses (fiction and nonfiction), divided 
between characters and social actors onscreen. Thus, the distinction between 
different levels of situational or existential knowledge is what allows us to 
recognize the ironic double discourse – and distinguish it from the 
mockumentary. 
What is the point? Irony as an attitude to life 
The use of irony in I’m Still Here suggests an (until now) untouched upon 
question, which has been posed by the majority of critical reviews and articles 
circulating around the film itself (e.g. Høeg 2010; Skotte 2010): what is the 
point? Besides the use of situational irony, I will argue that the use of irony in 
the film also discusses the concept as an attitude toward life. 
The distinction between irony as a rhetorical concept and an attitude toward 
life was first suggested by German philosopher Friedrich Schlegel. However, it 
was Kierkegaard in Om Begrebet Ironi (1962 [1841]) who reshaped ‘the ironic 
subject’ from Schlegel’s romantic character into a subject to whom “all existence 
has become foreign” (Kierkegaard 1962 [1841], 274; Bredsdorff 2011, 24-25). 
When Kierkegaard forwards this point, he aligns with a later version of the 
concept – the postmodern. In the essay ‘Private irony and liberal hope’ (1989, 
73), philosopher Richard Rorty describes the postmodern ironic as a person 
who has “radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary,” words, 
and concepts “which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their 
lives.” These are among others terms such as true, good, and right. The 
postmodern ironic is thus a person who has experienced a complete and utter 
breakdown of everything and for whom “the only acceptable attitude to 
assume is the ironic” (Bredsdorff 2011, 190). 
If we initially view Phoenix’s character in relation to the first interpretation (the 
film being a documentary), it makes sense to understand Phoenix in accordance 
with Kierkegaard’s ironic subject and Rorty’s postmodern ironic. In the 
beginning of the film, Phoenix includes the spectator in the idea of changing 
career, as he is having difficulty understanding why he started acting in the 
first place:  
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I don’t know what came first, whether they said that I was 
emotional and intense and complicated. Or whether I… Or 
whether I was truly complicated and intense and then they 
responded to it. (…) Yes, I utilized it in some ways… and I am 
embarrassed about that, and that is what a lot of this [the 
documentary] is about. (…) I don’t want to play the character of 
Joaquin anymore. (Phoenix, ca. 03.25-04.05)  
Here, Phoenix vocalizes radical doubts about his concepts of what feels true 
and right. Later, in the Olmos scene discussed above, Phoenix expresses how a 
new meaning, rap music, has presented itself to him. “My music makes people 
happy” (ca. 43.40), he explains, which of course is also ironic seen in the context 
of the hateful reactions we have heard earlier in the film, for instance when 
Phoenix’s friend, Matt, reads some bad reviews aloud (ca. 40.55-41.25). In these 
terms, I argue that the concept of irony in I’m Still Here is reflected as an attitude 
toward life or as a life condition by the character of Phoenix. But now, if the 
spectator is alerted by the conflictual textual or extra-textual evidence, she or 
he will adhere to the second interpretation – that I’m Still Here is an ironic 
double discursive film. Thus, as we have also learned, Phoenix’s points should 
be reversed to the exact opposite, as this is the very nature of irony. Phoenix, 
then, is not vocalizing radical thoughts about changing his life: he is mocking 
the idea that this is at all possible. 
The film’s narrative should be viewed from the same ironic perspective. In the 
first scene (as described above), we see a boy standing in a paradisiacal setting, 
jumping into the water. In the last scene (ca. 1.42.40-1.44.05), we find Phoenix 
descending slowly into a similar paradisiacal river in Panama. Without taking 
the point too far, this does, to some extent, illustrate a kind of liberation – from 
a paradisiacal state, through a mental crisis, and finally returning to another 
paradisiacal state. But irony catches up with the sentimentalist, and instead of 
creating a happy ending for our hero, I’m Still Here becomes a mockery of not 
only the documentary, the spectator, and idea that documentary and fiction 
discourse cannot exist simultaneously on a textual level – but also of the 
modern liberation narrative. It mocks the idea that Phoenix can leave his old 
world behind: the very idea that you can actually liberate yourself from the 
identity the media gives you, for instance as a failure. According to I’m Still 
Here, this is the great lie. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this article, I have argued that documentary and fiction can coexist 
within hybrid cinema in general and within the ironic double discourse in 
particular. I have also argued that this is mainly due to characters’, social 
actors’, and spectators’ recognition of situational irony (an ironist-created 
characteristic that doubles the discursive status of a given film). Furthermore, 
the question as to whether I’m Still Here is documentary or fiction has an 
equivocal answer: in the ironic double discursive sequences, it is quite simply 
a combination of both. There are two levels of situational and existential 
knowledge presented textually and simultaneously.  
This leaves us with a number of conclusions. First, the ironic double discourse 
is different from other hybrid cinematic modes, such as the mockumentary, 
since the levels of situational or existential knowledge in the films are 
hierarchical, not equal. Second, there are different discourses in I’m Still Here 
according to the spectator’s ability to understand the film’s use of irony: a 
reflexive-performative documentary mode (which can be regarded as ‘the 
wrong mode’, as it is affected by the intended misreading) and an ironic double 
discourse mode. If the situational irony employed by Phoenix in particular is 
not understood or is attributed the correct essence (that it is a hoax), spectators 
will tend to engage in the reflexive-performative documentary mode, mainly 
due to documentarian stylistic characteristics. If the film is interpreted as such, 
Phoenix can be viewed as possessing a certain Kierkegaardian and Rortian 
attitude to life and identity. However, if spectators understand the essence of 
the ironic phenomenon (as argued, mainly through conflictual textual evidence 
in this film), they will engage in the ironic double discourse. Due to the 
situational irony, Phoenix’s character is better viewed as a mockery – rather 
than as a representative – of the postmodern ironic. In the same manner, the 
liberatory ending that the character of Phoenix undergoes can be viewed as a 
criticism of the notion of liberation in modern narrative. 
Given that the ironic double discourse has invaded documentary and 
mockumentary discourse, we can assume that it has the potential to invade 
other discourses within, and even beyond, cinema. In contemporary culture, 
we have already witnessed how the phenomenon of hybridity has challenged 
narrative discourse, for instance, when author Karl Ove Knausgaard (primarily 
known for his autobiography-like opus, My Struggle (2009-2011)) has been 
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accused of actions expressed in his hybrid novels. But can he – or anyone – be 
held accountable for what is expressed within a phenomenon that combines 
fiction and nonfiction discourse? This dilemma illustrates how the 
phenomenon of hybridity prompts ethical questions that transcend the 
boundaries of cinema and aesthetics and collide with a reality in which an 
ambiguous notion of truth is not fully accepted.  
From this perspective, I see a number of relevant questions for further research 
concerning, for example, how theoretical and empirical spectators experience 
this privileged and ambiguous notion of truth in relation to hybrid discourses 
– aesthetic as well as journalistic. Evidently, these questions exceed the limits 
of this article, but we now know that the ironic double discourse challenges the 
border between documentary and fiction, not by erasing it but by connecting 
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